Introduction
The magnitude of the …scal spending multiplier is a classic subject in macroeconomics. To calculate the magnitude of the multiplier, economists typically employ a linearized version of their actual nonlinear model. Does linearizing the nonlinear model matter for the conclusions about the multiplier? We document this may be the case, especially in long-lived liquidity traps. When interest rates are expected to be constrained by the zero (or e¤ective) lower bound for a protracted time period, the nonlinear solution suggests a much smaller multiplier than the linearized solution of the same model.
The …nancial crisis and "Great Recession" have revived interest in the magnitude of the …scal spending multiplier. A quickly growing literature suggests that the …scal spending multiplier can be very large when nominal interest rates are expected to be constrained by the zero (or e¤ective) lower bound (ZLB) for a prolonged period, see e.g. Eggertsson (2010) , Davig and Leeper (2011) , Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) , Woodford (2011) , Coenen et al. (2012) and Leeper, Traum and Walker (2015) . Erceg and Linde (2014) show that in a long-lived liquidity trap …scal stimulus can come at low cost to the treasury and even be a "…scal free lunch". Conversely, the results of the above literature suggest that it is di¢ cult to reduce government debt in the short-run through aggressive government spending cuts in long-lived liquidity traps: …scal consolidation can in fact be self-defeating in such a situation.
Importantly, the bulk of the existing literature analyzes …scal multipliers in models where all equilibrium equation have been linearized around the steady state, except for the ZLB constraint on the monetary policy rule. Implicit in the linearization procedure is the assumption that the linearized solution is accurate even far away from the steady state. However, recent work by Boneva, Braun, and Waki (2016) suggests that linearization produces severely misleading results at the zero lower bound. Essentially, Boneva et al. argue that extrapolating decision rules far away from the steady state is invalid.
Our paper provides a positive analysis of the e¤ect of spending-based …scal stimulus on output and government debt using a fully nonlinear model. We compare the …scal spending multipliers for output and government debt of the nonlinear and linearized solution as function of the liquidity trap duration. Moreover, our framework allows us to pin down the key features which account for the di¤erence between the multiplier schedule for the nonlinear and linearized solutions of the model.
2
The model environment is a variant of the canonical New Keynesian DSGE model of Woodford (2003) . This model features monopolistic competition and Calvo sticky prices and the central bank follows a Taylor rule subject to the ZLB constraint on nominal rates. 1 A distinct di¤erence to the existing literature which uses variations of the standard New Keynesian model -for instance the recent work by Boneva, Braun and Waki (2016) , Christiano, Eichenbaum and Johannsen (2016) , Eggertsson and Singh (2016) , Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015) and Nakata (2015) -is that we consider a framework with real rigidities. Speci…cally, we introduce real rigidities through the Kimball (1995) state-dependent demand elasticity which allows our model to simultaneously account for the macroeconomic evidence of a low linearized Phillips curve slope (0.01) and the microeconomic evidence of frequent price re-optimization (3-4 quarters). 2 Due to its ability to the ease the tensions between the macro-and microeconomic evidence on price setting, the Kimball aggregator has gained traction in New Keynesian models and it is for example used in the workhorse Smets and Wouters (2007) model.
Our main results are as follows. First, we show that the nonlinear solution is associated with a much smaller …scal spending multiplier than the linearized solution in long-lived liquidity traps.
More precisely, when the ZLB is expected to bind for 3 years, the nonlinear solution implies a multiplier of about 2/3 while the linearized solution of the same model implies a multiplier slightly above 2. As the multiplier in our benchmark model with real rigidities equals 1/3 in normal times when the ZLB does not bind, the nonlinear solution implies roughly a doubling of the multiplier in a long-lived trap, whereas the linearized solution implies that the multiplier is elevated seven times.
What accounts for the large di¤erence between the nonlinear and linearized solutions in a prolonged liquidity trap? We document that the di¤erence can almost entirely be accounted for by the nonlinearities in the price setting block of the model -the Phillips curve. Key here is the nonlinearity implied by the Kimball aggregator. The Kimball aggregator implies that the demand elasticity for intermediate goods is state-dependent, i.e. the …rms'demand elasticity is an increasing function of its relative price. In short, the demand curve is quasi-kinked. While the fully nonlinear model takes this state-dependency explicitly into account, a linear approximation replaces that nonlinearity by a linear function. Put di¤erently, linearization replaces the quasi-kinked demand 1 We rule out the well-known problems associated with steady state multiplicity emphasized by Benhabib, SchmittGrohe and Uribe (2001) by restricting our attention to the steady state with a positive in ‡ation rate.
2 There is also a recent literature which studies models where the e¤ects of government spending is state dependent (i.e. di¤ers in booms and recessions even absent zero lower bound considerations due to labor market frictions), see e.g. Michaillat (2014) , Rendahl (2016) and Roulleau-Pasdeloup (2016) . This paper does not address this literature.
curve with a linear function. 3 Intuitively, in a deep recession that triggers the ZLB to bind for a long time, the Kimball aggregator carries the implication that …rms do not …nd it attractive to cut their prices much since that reduces the demand elasticity and thereby does not crowd in more demand. With more …scal spending in such a situation, …rms also …nd it less attractive to increase their prices. Thus -with policy rates stuck at zero -aggregate in ‡ation increases only little and therefore the real interest rate falls by little: the multiplier does not increase to the same extent with the duration of the ZLB. When the model is linearized, the response of aggregate in ‡ation is notably stronger due to the nature of a linear approximation of a quasi-kinked demand curve at the steady state with no dispersion. Hence, the drop in the real interest rate is elevated following a spending hike and the multiplier is magni…ed. The bottom line: the linearized version of the model exaggerates the rise in expected and actual in ‡ation due to a sizable approximation error and thereby elevates the magnitude of the …scal multiplier in long-lived liquidity traps. 4 Our results have potentially important implications for the scope of …scal stimulus to be self…nancing, and the extent to which …scal consolidations can be self-defeating. In the nonlinear model, …scal stimulus is never a "free lunch" as in Erceg and Lindé (2014) ; and conversely, …scal consolidations are never self-defeating. The linearized solution arrives at the opposite conclusions: …scal stimulus can be self-…nancing in a su¢ ciently long-lived liquidity trap and …scal consolidations can be self-defeating. However, although these …ndings cast doubt on the …ndings of the existing literature on the …scal implications of stimulus, it should be recalled that we are considering a model environment where the …scal output multiplier is small in normal times (1/3 as mentioned earlier).
Had we instead considered a model in which the multiplier were in the mid-range of the empirical evidence (i.e. a multiplier slightly less than unity) when monetary policy is unconstrained, it is possible that the multiplier could be magni…ed su¢ ciently in a long-lived liquidity trap to obtain a "…scal free lunch" for a transient hike in spending. 5 We elaborate further on this issue in the conclusions.
Our paper is related to Boneva, Braun and Waki (2016) , Johannsen (2016), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015) , Nakata (2015) and Eggertsson and Singh (2016) . Importantly, none of the above papers considers the case of a Kimball (1995) aggregator. Boneva, 3 It is well known that in a linearized model, the Kimball (1995) and Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) aggregator -the latter featuring a constant demand elasticity -are observationally equivalent up to a factor of proportionality. 4 The small rise in in ‡ation expectations is consistent with Dupor and Li (2015) , who argue that expected in ‡ation reacted little to spending shocks in the United States during the Great Recession.
5 A large empirical literature has examined the e¤ects of government spending shocks, mainly focusing on the post-WWII pre-…nancial crisis period when monetary policy had latitude to adjust interest rates. The bulk of this research suggests a government spending multiplier in the range of 0.5 to somewhat above unity (1.5). See e.g. Hall (2009 ), Ramey (2011 ), Blanchard, Erceg and Lindé (2016 and the references therein. Braun and Waki (2016) report that the multiplier is smaller in a fully nonlinear model. Their model features a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Eggertsson and Singh (2016) report that the multipliers of the nonlinear and linearized model di¤er only very little. Their model features a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator and assumes …rms-speci…c labor markets, implying that price dispersion is irrelevant for the nonlinear model dynamics. By contrast, our analysis shows how important these assumptions are: moving to the frequently used Kimball aggregator and allowing for price dispersion alters the conclusions about the multiplier substantially. Nakata (2015) and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015) show that shock uncertainty may have potentially important implications for equilibrium dynamics.
Even so, robustness analysis shows that allowing for shock uncertainty have very limited impact on our results when the degree of price adjustment (and thus the extent to which how quickly expected in ‡ation adjusts) is calibrated to …t the macroevidence on the slope of Phillips curve. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Johannsen (2016) analyze multiplicity of equilibria in a nonlinear New Keynesian model. They document that there is a unique stable-under-learning rational expectations equilibrium in their model and that all other equilibriums are not stable under learning.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the small scale New Keynesian model and Section 3 the results. Section 4 examines the robustness of the results to various perturbations of the model. Section 5 concludes.
A Stylized New Keynesian Model
The simple model we study is very similar to the one developed Erceg and Linde (2014) , which in turn builds on the baseline Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) model with the exception that it allows for real e¤ects of price distortions by dropping the assumption that labor cannot be reallocated between di¤erent …rms (or industries). We deviate from Erceg and Linde (2014) in two ways; …rst by allowing for a Kimball (1995) aggregator (with the standard Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) speci…cation as a special case), and second, by including a discount factor (or savings) shock. Below, we outline the model and its key nonlinear equations. In the Appendix A, we describe the linearized version.
Model

Households
The utility functional for the representative household is max fCt;Nt;Btg
where the discount factor satis…es 0 < < 1 and is subject to an exogenous shock & t : As in Erceg and Lindé (2014) , the utility function depends on the household's current consumption C t as deviation from a "reference level" C t+j . The exogenous consumption taste shock t raises the reference level and marginal utility of consumption. The utility function also depends negatively on hours worked N t :
The household's budget constraint in period t states that its expenditure on goods and net purchases of (zero-coupon) government bonds B G;t must equal its disposable income:
Thus, the household purchases the …nal consumption good at price P t . The household is subject to a constant distortionary labor income tax N and earns after-tax labor income (1
The household pays lump-sum taxes net of transfers T t and receives a proportional share of the pro…ts t of all intermediate …rms.
Utility maximization yields the standard consumption Euler equation
where we have de…ned
and introduced the notation 1 + t+1 = P t+1 =P t . We also have the following labor supply schedule:
Equations (3) and (5) are the key equations for the household side of the model.
Firms and Price Setting
Final Goods Production The single …nal output good Y t is produced using a continuum of di¤eren- Following Kimball (1995) , the technology for transforming these intermediate goods into the …nal output good is Figure   1 ). Finally, we notice that G(1) = 1, implying constant returns to scale when all intermediate …rms produce the same amount.
Firms that produce the …nal output good are perfectly competitive in both product and factor markets. Thus, …nal goods producers minimize the cost of producing a given quantity of the output index Y t , taking as given the price P t (f ) of each intermediate good Y t (f ). Moreover, …nal goods producers sell units of the …nal output good at a price P t , and hence solve the following problem:
subject to the constraint (6). The …rst order conditions can be written as
The …gure is taken from Levin, Lopez-Salido and Yun (2007) , and the mapping between and p is given by
A value of = 8 thus implies that p equals 88 when the gross markup p equals 1.1. 7 where p t denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the aggregator constraint (7). Note that for p = 0 (and thus = 0); p t = 1 8t and the …rst-order conditions in (9) simpli…es to the usual Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) expressions
by monopolistically competitive …rms, each of which produces a single di¤erentiated good. Each intermediate goods producer faces a demand schedule from the …nal goods …rms through the solution to the problem in eq. (8) that varies inversely with its output price P t (f ) and directly with aggregate demand Y t :
Aggregate capital (K) is assumed to be …xed, so that aggregate production of the intermediate good …rm is given by
Despite the …xed aggregate stock K R K (f ) df , shares of it can be freely allocated across the f …rms, implying that real marginal cost, M C t (f )=P t is identical across …rms and equal to
where
The prices of the intermediate goods are determined by Calvo-Yun (1996) style staggered nominal contracts. In each period, each …rm f faces a constant probability, 1 p , of being able to re-optimize its price P t (f ). The probability that any …rm receives a signal to reset its price is assumed to be independent of the time that it last reset its price. If a …rm is not allowed to optimize its price in a given period, it adjusts its price according to the following formulã
where is the steady-state (net) in ‡ation rate andP t is the updated price.
Given Calvo-style pricing frictions, …rm f that is allowed to re-optimize its price, P opt t (f ), solves the following problem
where t;t+j is the stochastic discount factor (the conditional value of future pro…ts in utility units, recalling that the household is the owner of the …rms), and demand Y t+j (f ) from the …nal goods …rms is given by the equations in (9).
Monetary and Fiscal Policies
The evolution of nominal government debt is determined by the following equation
where G t denotes real government expenditures on the …nal good Y t . Following the convention in the literature on …scal multipliers, we assuming that lump-sum taxes stabilize government debt as share of nominal trend GDP, b G;t
. Speci…cally, we follow Erceg and Linde (2014) and assume that net lump-sum taxes as share of nominal trend GDP, t
Tt PtY
, follow the simple rule:
where variables without time subscript denote steady state. Finally, government spending, g y;t
Gt Y is exogenous.
Turning to the central bank, it is assumed to adhere to a Taylor-type policy rule that is subject to the zero lower bound:
where Y pot t denotes the level of output that would prevail if prices were ‡exible, and i the steadystate (net) nominal interest rate, which is given by r + where r 1= 1. In the linearized model, (15) is written
is the model-consistent output gap.
Aggregate Resource Constraint
We now turn to discuss the derivation of the aggregate resource constraint. Let Y sum t denote the unweighted average (sum) of output for each …rm f , i.e.
which from (10) and the observation that all …rms have the same capital-labor ratio can be rewritten as
Recalling that Y t+j (f ) is given from (9), it follows that
or equivalently, using (17):
In a technical appendix, available upon request, we show how to develop a recursive formulation of the sticky price distortion term p t . Now, because actual output Y t is what is available for private consumption and government spending purposes, it follows that:
The sticky price distortion introduces a wedge between input use and the output available for private and government consumption. 7 Even so, this term vanishes in the log-linearized version of the model.
Parameterization
Our benchmark calibration essentially adopted from Erceg and Linde (2014) is fairly standard at a quarterly frequency. We set the discount factor = 0:995; and the steady state net in ‡ation rate = :005; this implies a steady state interest rate of i = :01 (i.e., four percent at an annualized rate). We set the intertemporal substitution elasticity = 1 (log utility); the capital share parameter = 0:3; the Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1 = 0:4; and the steady state value for the consumption taste shock = 0:01: 8 Three parameters determine the direct sensitivity of prices to marginal costs: the gross markup p , the stickiness parameter p and the Kimball parameter p . We have direct evidence on two of these -p and p . When it comes the latter, a large body of microeconomic evidence, see e.g. Klenow and Malin (2010) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) and the references therein, suggest that …rms change their prices rather frequently, on average 7 As the economy is assumed to be endowned with a …xed aggregate capital stock K which does not depreciate, no resources is devoted to investment. An alternative formulation would have embodied a constant capital depreciation rate in which case output would have been used for Ct, I and Gt.somewhat more often than once a year. Based on this micro evidence, we set p = 0:667, implying an average price contract duration of 3 quarters ( 1 1 0:667 ). For the gross markup, we set p = 1:2 as a compromise between the low estimate of p in Altig et al. (2011) and the higher estimated value by Smets and Wouters (2007) . In addition, this is the estimated value by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010) , and used by e.g. Levin, LopezSalido and Yun (2007) and Eggertsson and Singh (2016) . To pin down p , our starting point is the loglinearized New Keynesian Phillips Curvê
which obtains in our model where d mc t denotes marginal cost as log-deviation from its steady state value. The parameter mc , i.e. the slope of the Phillips curve, is given by
The macroeconomic evidence suggest that the sensitivity of aggregate in ‡ation to variations in marginal cost is very low, see e.g. Altig et al. (2011) . To capture this, we adopt a value for p so that the slope of the Phillips curve ( mc ) given our adopted values for , p and p equals 0:012. 9 This calibration allows us to match both the micro-and macroevidence on price setting behavior and is aimed at capturing the resilience of core in ‡ation, and measures of expected in ‡ation, during the recent global recession.
We assume a government debt to annualized output ratio of 0:6 (consistent with U.S. pre-crisis federal debt level). We set government consumption as a share of output g y = 0:2: Further, we set net lump-sum taxes = 0 in steady state. The above assumptions imply a steady state labor income tax N = 0:33. The parameter ' in the tax rule (14) is set equal to 0:01, which implies that the contribution of lump-sum taxes to the response of government debt is negligible in the …rst couple of years following a shock (so that almost all variation in tax revenues re ‡ect ‡uctuations in labor tax revenues). For monetary policy, we use the standard Taylor (1993) rule parameters = 1:5 and x = :125.
In order to facilitate comparison between the nonlinear and linear model, we specify processes for the exogenous shocks such that there is no loss in precision due to an approximation. In particular, the preference, discount and government spending shocks are assumed to follow AR (1) processes:
where = 1. Our baseline parameterization of these processes adopts a persistence coe¢ cient of 0:95, so that = g = = 0:95 in (22). But following some prominent papers in the literature on …scal multipliers, we also investigate the sensitivity of our results when the processes are assumed to be moving average (MA) processes. Those results are reported in Appendix A.
Solving the Model
We compute the linearized and nonlinear solutions using the Fair and Taylor (1983) monetary policy is far from non-optimal and prices are quick to adjust. We nevertheless con…ne ourself to study perfect foresight simulations for the following three reasons. First, because much of the existing literature have in fact used a perfect foresight approach, retaining this approach allows us to parse out the e¤ects of going from a linearized to a nonlinear framework. Second, the high degree of real rigidities we introduce in order to …t the micro-and macroeconomic evidence implies that expected in ‡ation adjusts slowly, which in turn means that the impact of future shock uncertainty is modest. Even so, allowing for shock uncertainty only strengthens our …nding of a pronounced di¤erence between the linearized and nonlinear solutions in a long-lived trap as the responses in the linearized equilibrium is ampli…ed relatively more than the nonlinear solution by future shock uncertainty. 10 Third, the perfect foresight assumption allows us to readily study the 1 0 We have veri…ed this by comparing the decision rules under perfect foresight with the decision rules obtained when allowing for shock uncertainty (calibrating the variance of the shocks in the model so that the probability is robustness in a larger scale model with many state variables. So far, the solution algorithms used to solve models with shock uncertainty have typically not been applied to models with more than 4-5 state variables. 11 To solve the model, we feed the relevant equations in the nonlinear and log-linearized versions of the model to Dynare. Dynare is a pre-processor and a collection of MATLAB routines which can solve nonlinear models with forward looking variables, and the details about the implementation of the algorithm used can be found in Juillard (1996) . We use the perfect foresight simulation algorithm implemented in Dynare using the 'simul'command. 12 The algorithm can easily handle the ZLB constraint: one just writes the Taylor rule including the max operator in the model equations, and the solution algorithm reliably calculates the model solution is fractions of a second.
Thus, apart from gaining intuition about the mechanisms embedded into the models, there is no need anymore to linearize models in order to solve and simulate them.
For the linearized model, we used the algorithm outlined in Hebden, Linde and Svensson (2012) to check for uniqueness of the local equilibrium associated with a positive steady state in ‡ation rate. As noted earlier, we rule the well-known problems associated with steady state multiplicity emphasized by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) by restricting our attention to the steady state with a positive in ‡ation rate. However, for the nonlinear version of the model we cannot rule out the possibility that there exists other solutions in addition to the one found by Dynare, but note that the work by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Johannsen (2016) suggest that alternative solutions may not be relevant (i.e. not stable under learning).
Results
In this section, we report the benchmark results. As mentioned earlier, our aim is to compare spending multipliers in linearized and nonlinear versions of the model economy. Speci…cally, we seek to characterize how the di¤erence between the multiplier in the linear and nonlinear frameworks varies with the expected duration of the liquidity trap. We start out by reporting how we construct the baseline scenarios and then report the marginal …scal multipliers.
hitting the ZLB is 0.2 percent each quarter of the stochastic simulations with the model, in line with Post WWII U.S. evidence).
1 1 A recent paper by Judd, Maliar and Maliar (2011) provides a promising avenue to compute the stochastic solution of larger scale models e¢ ciently.
1 2 The solution algorithm implemented in Dynare's simul command is the method developed in Fair and Taylor (1983) .
Construction of Baseline Scenarios
To construct a baseline where the interest rate is bounded at zero for ZLB DU R = 1; 2; 3; :::; T periods, we follow the previous …scal multiplier literature (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2011) and assume that the economy is hit by a large adverse shock that triggers a deep recession and drives interest rates to zero. The longer the expected liquidity trap duration (i.e. the larger value of ZLB DU R ) we want to consider, the larger the adverse shock has to be. The particular shock we consider is a negative consumption taste shock t (see the equations 1 and 22) following Erceg and Linde (2014) . 13 To provide clarity on how we pick the shock sizes, Figure 2 reports the linear and nonlinear solutions for the same negative taste shock (depicted in the bottom right panel). The economy is in the deterministic steady state in period 0, and then the shock hits the economy in period 1. Figure 2 , the same-sized shock has a rather di¤erent impact on the economy depending on whether the model is linearized or solved in its original nonlinear form. For instance, we see from panel 3 that while the nominal interest rate is bounded by zero from periods 1 to 8 in the linearized model, the same-sized consumption demand shock (panel 9) only generates a two quarter trap in the nonlinear model. Hence, we need to subject the nonlinear model to a more negative consumption demand shock as shown by the red dotted line in panel 9 in Figure 3 to generate ZLB DU R = 8 for the interest rate (panel 3). 14 Important insights about the di¤erences between the linearized and nonlinear solutions can be gained from Figures 2 and 3. Starting with Figure 2 , we see from the …fth panel that the drop in the potential real rate is about the same in both models. Still, the linearized model generates a much longer liquidity trap because in ‡ation and expected in ‡ation falls much more (panel 2), which in turn causes the actual real interest rate (panel 4) to rise much more initially. The larger initial rise in the actual real interest rate, and thus the gap between the actual and potential real rates, triggers a larger fall in the output gap (panel 1) and consequently real GDP falls more in the linearized model as well (because the impact on potential GDP is about the same, as implied by the similarity of the potential real interest rate response).
As is evident from
Turning to Figure 3 , we …rst note from the third panel that the paths for the policy rate are bounded at zero for 8 quarters and display a very similar path upon exit from the liquidity trap.
Moreover, panel 9 shows that it takes a much larger adverse consumption demand shock in the nonlinear model to trigger a liquidity trap of the same expected duration as in the linearized model.
This implies that the drop in the potential real rate and real GDP (panels 5 and 7) is much more severe in the nonlinear model. Even so, and perhaps most important, we see that in ‡ ation panel 2 falls substantially less in the nonlinear model. This suggests that the di¤erence between the linearized and nonlinear solutions to a large extent is driven by the pricing block of the model.
Marginal Fiscal Multipliers
As previously noted, we are seeking to compare …scal multipliers in liquidity traps of same expected duration in the linearized and nonlinear frameworks. Accordingly, we allow for di¤erently sized shocks in the linearized and nonlinear models so that each model variant generates a liquidity trap with the same expected duration ZLB DU R = 1; 2; 3; :::; T . Let where we consider i = 1; 2; :::; T: In the speci…c case of i = 8; panel 9 in Figure 3 shows that linear;8 = :18 and nonlin;8 = :42. To these di¤erent baseline paths, we add the …scal response in the …rst period the ZLB binds, which happens in the same period as the adverse shock hits (t = 1). By letting
denote vectors with simulated variables in the linear and nonlinear solutions when both the negative baseline shock and the positive government spending shock G hits the economy, we can compute the partial impact of the …scal spending shock as
for j = flinear; nonling and where we write I j t (ZLB DU R ) to highlight its dependence on the liquidity trap duration. Notice that the …scal spending shock is the same for all i and is scaled so that ZLB DU R remains the same as under the baseline shock only. By setting the …scal impulse so that the liquidity trap duration remains una¤ected, we retrieve "marginal"spending multipliers in the sense that they show the impact of a "tiny" change in the …scal instrument. 15 In Figure 4 we report the results of our exercise. The upper panels report results for the benchmark calibration with the Kimball aggregator. The lower panels report results under the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, in which case p = 0. This parametrization implies a substantially higher slope of the linearized Phillips curve (see eq. 21) and thus a much stronger sensitivity of expected in ‡ation to current and expected future marginal costs (and output gaps). We will …rst discuss the results under the Kimball parameterization, and then turn to the Dixit-Stiglitz results.
The left panels report the output-spending multiplier on impact, i.e. simply
where the -operator represents the di¤erence between the scenario with the spending change and the baseline without the spending change and Y denotes the steady state level of output. We compute m i for ZLB DU R = 1; :::; 12, but also include results for the case when the economy is at the steady state, so that ZLB DU R = 0.
As the linear approximation is more accurate the closer the economy is to the steady state, it is not surprising that the di¤erence between the "linear"and "nonlinear"multiplier increases with the duration of the liquidity trap. In a three-year liquidity trap, the multiplier in the nonlinear solution is about twice as high (0.65) compared to normal times (when it is about 0.30), whereas it is about 7 times higher (2:1) Figure 4 suggest that the …ndings of the papers in the previous literature which relied on linearized models were more distorted to the extent that they relied on a calibration with a higher slope of the Phillips curve and thus a larger sensitivity of expected in ‡ation.
The key question is then why expected in ‡ation responds so much more in the linearized economy, and particularly so in the Dixit-Stiglitz case? To shed light on this, we simulate two additional variants of the nonlinear model. In the …rst, we linearize the pricing equations of the model, e.g.
replace all pricing equations in the nonlinear model with the standard linearized Phillips curve.
In the second, we linearize all the pricing equations and remove the price distortion term from the aggregate resource constraint (19). Following the approach with the linear and fully nonlinear models, we construct baseline scenarios for the two additional variants of the model as described in driven by an e¤ectively lower response to marginal costs when the price dispersion term is elevated.
The price dispersion term per se does not matter much, but the fact that the price dispersion is elevated following an adverse shock implies that many …rms percieve that their demand elasticity is high and are therefore reluctant to change prices much at all in response to changes in marginal costs (in terms of Figure 1 , they are located in the upper left quadrant).
The lower panels in Figure 5 , however, show that log-linearization of the New Keynesian Phillips curve only is not su¢ cient to explain the large discrepancies between the linear and nonlinear solutions under the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. In this case, accounting for the price distortion in the aggregate resource constraint is necessary, i.e. log-linearizing the resource constraint so that movements in the price distortion term p t in eq. (18) becomes irrelevant for equilibrium dynamics.
The reason for this di¤erence between the Kimball and the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators is that the price distortion variable moves much more for the latter speci…cation as re-optimizing …rms will adjust their prices much more under Dixit-Stiglitz compared to Kimball for given p (recalling the insights from Figure 1 ). So in a Dixit-Stiglitz world where …rms adjust prices a lot when they re-optimize, the bulk of the di¤erence between the linearized and nonlinear solutions is driven by movements in the price distortion, whereas in the Kimball world where …rms adjust prices by less, the bulk of the di¤erences is driven by the pricing equations directly.
Boneva, Braun and Waki (2016) argue that the key is to account for the price distortion, and our results suggest their claim is valid given that they are considering a model framework in line with the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. In terms of multiplier sizes, it is important to note that we report lower multipliers that Boneva, Braun and Waki in Figure 4 (for comparable degree of price adjustment) because our spending process is assumed to be a fairly persistent AR(1) process. If we assume that spending follows an uniform MA process and is only increased as long as policy rates are constrained by the ZLB, we obtain a marginal multiplier of unity in both the linear and nonlinear solutions already in a one-quarter liquidity trap (as we should, see Woodford, 2011, for proof) . 18 Even so, there is an important di¤erence between the linearized and nonlinear solution for longer-lived liquidity traps, where multiplier rises to 5 in a three-year trap in the former case but only to 1.03 in the nonlinear solution. This is in line with Boneva, Braun and Waki, who reports a maximum multiplier of 1.05 in their model.
Robustness analysis
In this section, we examine the robustness of the results w.r.t. the aggregator speci…cation (Kimball vs. Dixit-Stiglitz) as well as to the indexation schedule for …rms which are not able to re-optimize their prices.
Dixit-Stiglitz vs. Kimball
To further tease out the di¤erence between the Kimball vs. Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, Panel A in Even so, the nonlinear solutions shown in Panel A in Figure 6 di¤er. In particular, we see that the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator implies that expected in ‡ ation and output multiplier responds more when the duration of the liquidity trap increases. Thus, when the Kimball parameter p is reduced, the more will expected in ‡ ation and output multiplier respond when ZLB DU R increases; conversely, increasing p and lowering p ‡ attens the output multiplier schedule even more. The explanation behind this …nding is that a higher value of p induces the elasticity of demand to vary more with the relative price di¤erential among the intermediate good …rms as shown in Figure 1 , and this price di¤erential increases when the economy is far from the steady state. Thus, intermediate …rms which only infrequently are able to re-optimize their price will optimally choose to respond less to a given …scal impetus far from the steady state when price di¤erentials are larger as they perceive that they may have a much larger impact on their demand for a given change in their relative price.
As a result, aggregate current and expected in ‡ation are less a¤ected far from the steady state in the Kimball case relative to the Dixit-Stiglitz case for which the elasticity of demand is independent of relative price di¤erentials. This demonstrates that the modeling of price frictions matters importantly within a nonlinear framework, especially so when nominal wages are ‡exible.
Indexation of non-optimizing …rms
So far, we have followed the convention in the literature and assumed that non-optimizing …rms index their prices w.r.t. the steady state in ‡ation rate, see eq. (12). This is a convenient benchmark modelling assumption as it simpli…es the analysis by removing steady state price distortions. However, this assumption have been criticized for being inconsistent with the microevidence on price setting. According to micro evidence on price setting, many …rms' prices remain unchanged for several subsequent quarters, whereas whey always change under our benchmark indexation scheme.
Thus -there is an important issue to what extent this matters for aggregate dynamics, especially in the nonlinear solution. To examine this, we re-specify the model assuming no indexation among the non-optimizing …rms following e.g. Ascari and Ropele (2007) , i.e.
In Panel B in Figure 6 , we report the results when comparing the nonlinear baseline model 
Conclusions
We have calculated the magnitude of the fiscal spending multiplier in linearized and nonlinear solutions of a New Keynesian model at the zero lower bound. Importantly, we use a model that is amended with real rigidities to simultaneously account for the macroeconomic evidence of a low Equation (A.1) expresses the "New Keynesian"IS curve in terms of the output and real interest rate gaps. Thus, the output gap x t depends inversely on the deviation of the real interest rate (i t t+1jt ) from its potential rate r pot t , as well as on the expected output gap in the following period. The parameter^ determines the sensitivity of the output gap to the real interest rate; as indicated by (A.7), it depends on the household's intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption , the steady state government spending share of output g y , and a (small) adjustment factor c which scales the consumption taste shock t . The price-setting equation (A.2) speci…es current in ‡ation t to depend on expected in ‡ation and the output gap, where the sensitivity to the latter is determined by the composite parameter p . Given the Calvo-Yun contract structure, equation (A.8) implies that p varies directly with the sensitivity of marginal cost to the output gap mc ; and inversely with the mean contract duration ( However, the lower panels in Figure A .1 show that the results are very similar even in the nonlinear solution, so our choice of baseline appears immaterial.
Another aspect we want to understand is how our results di¤er from Boneva, Braun, and Waki (2016) due to our AR(1) assumption for government spending instead of the MA-process they work with. Figure A .2 assess this issue by comparing the results under our benchmark AR(1) process with persistence :95 for government spending against the MA process for which G t is increased in an uniform fashion as long at the policy rate is bounded at zero for ZLB DU R = 1; 2; 3; :::; T and set at its steady state value otherwise. Apart from the fact that our solution procedure does not account for future shock uncertainty, this way of modeling government spending is identical to Boneva et al. who in turns follow Eggertsson (2010) .
As can be seen from the upper panels of Figure A .2, the MA-process increases the marginal spending multiplier substantially relative to the AR(1) process for the ZLB durations we consider.
This happens as increases in government spending has very benign e¤ects on the potential real interest rate when the duration of the spending hike equals the expected duration of the liquidity trap (see e.g. Erceg and Lindé, 2014) . For a one quarter liquidity trap the multiplier equals unity, as shown analytically by Woodford (2011) . Our fairly persistent AR(1) process tends to dampen the multiplier schedule as a relatively large fraction of the spending comes on line when the ZLB is no longer binding. This feature explains why the AR(1) multiplier is substantially lower in a short lived liquidity trap. However, the AR(1) process is also associated with a substantially lower multiplier even in a fairly long-lived trap compared to the MA process because its has less benign e¤ects on the potential real rate.
All this is well-known from the literature on linearized models. However, the results for the nonlinear model, shown in the lower panels, are less explored. We have already discussed the AR (1) case at length in the text. What we see is that the results for the MA process are quite di¤erent for longer ZLB durations, because the MA schedule for the nonlinear model stays essentially ‡at at unity, in line with the …ndings of Braun et al. (2013) ; for a 12-quarter trap the multiplier only increases to 1.03 from a multiplier of unity in a one-period liquidity trap. This is sharp contrast to the multiplier schedule for the linearized model where the multiplier is as high as 5 in a liquidity trap lasting 3 years. All told, the results in this appendix shows that our benchmark results holds 
